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I. INTRODUCTION
  
This essay is intended to perform two tasks. First, it describes the 
imperative behind the annual "National Security, Emerging 
Technologies, and the Law" Symposium jointly sponsored by the 
American Bar Association ("ABA") and The Ohio State University 
Moritz College of Law ("OSU"). Toward this end the essay introduces 
the reader to artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and synthetic 
biology along with their national security applications and 
implications. Second, the essay identifies eight Symposium takeaways, 
key points that should inform the application of national security law 
and process to emerging technologies going forward. The intent of this 
article (as was the intent of the Symposium) is to establish a 
framework for discussion and decision, with the hope that the next 
conference will build upon these conclusions, not repeat them.  
II. EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND NATIONAL SECURITY
Emerging technologies, like artificial intelligence (AI), quantum 
computing (QC), and synthetic biology, offer great commercial and 
humanitarian promise. Artificial intelligence applications, for 
example, are a valuable tool in treating cancer, with better than 
human accuracy in identifying tumors. Alone, or paired with the 
computational capacity of quantum computing, AI promises to help 
cure diseases as well as to stem environmental degradation, in 
addition to empowering driverless cars, delivering packages, and 
running kitchen appliances. Likewise, synthetic biologics, such as 
tools used to alter gene sequences, can be used to drive genetic 
selection toward more fertile crops or to sterilize and eliminate 
disease vectors, rather than defer those goals to the less certain and 
time-consuming process of natural selection. 
These same technologies, however, will also impact, and likely 
transform, national security in both positive and negative ways. 
Stephen Hawking said, “The rise of powerful AI will be either the best 
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or the worst thing to ever happen to humanity.”1 A 2017 study 
concluded that “Future progress in AI has the potential to be a 
transformative national security technology, on a par with nuclear 
weapons, aircraft, computers, and biotech.”2 In 2017, China’s State 
Council approved a plan to make China the world leader in the AI field 
by 2030, targeting a gross output of $150 billion for the core AI 
industry.3 Vladimir Putin has declared “the one who becomes the 
leader in this sphere will be the ruler of the world.”4 No wonder AI is 
at the center of the Department of Defense’s Third Offset Strategy, 
using technology to offset the geographic, asymmetric, and numerical 
advantages of potential adversaries.5  
In short, AI is recognized as a national security tool by critical 
actors. It is here and here to stay. Quantum computing, in turn, has 
the potential to exponentially speed up this process. It also has the 
potential to transform the world of encryption, potentially unlocking 
virtually all current encryption applications, applications that protect 
nuclear codes, financial transactions, and every-day communications; 
unless of course, quantum computing leads to unbreakable codes first. 
1 Stephen Hawking, Professor, Speech at the Launch of the Leverhulm Centre for the 
Future of Intelligence, Cambridge, England. (Oct. 19, 2016), 
https://www.cam.ac.uk/research/news/the-best-or-worst-thing-to-happen-to-humanity-
stephen-hawking-launches-centre-for-the-future-of [https://perma.cc/96G4-CSB3]. 
2 Gʀᴇɢ Aʟʟᴇɴ & Tᴀɴɪᴇʟ Cʜᴀɴ, AʀᴛɪFɪᴄɪᴀʟ Iɴᴛᴇʟʟɪɢᴇɴᴄᴇ ᴀɴᴅ Nᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Sᴇᴄᴜʀɪᴛʏ, BELFER CENTER 
FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS STUDY 1 (Jul. 2017), 
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/AI%20NatSec%20-
%20final.pdf [https://perma.cc/LH8D-U67W]. 
3 JEFFREY DING, DECIPHERING CHINA’S AI DREAM: THE CONTEXT, COMPONENTS 
CAPABILITIES, AND CONSEQUENCES OF CHINA’S STRATEGY TO LEAD THE WORLD IN AI, 
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD FUTURE OF HUMANITY INSTITUTE 7 (Mar. 2018), 
https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Deciphering_Chinas_AI-Dream-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/789C-THMW]. 
4 Putin: Leader in Artificial Intelligence Will Rule World, CNBC (Sep. 4, 2017), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/04/putin-leader-in-artificial-intelligence-will-rule-
world.html [https://perma.cc/TX97-HVNB]. 
5 See, e.g., Bob Work, Deputy Sec’y of Def., Speech at the Dep’t of Def. CNAS Def. Forum, 
(Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-
View/Article/634214/cnas-defense-forum/ [https://perma.cc/5S8S-67KN]; see also, U.S. 
DEP’T OF DEFENSE, SUMMARY OF THE 2018 NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA: SHARPENING THE AMERICAN MILITARY’S COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 3 
(2018), https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-
Strategy-Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8B4-SLUB]. 
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There is an “arms race” here as elsewhere, not just between nations, 
but between those who research for offensive purposes and those who 
do so for defense.  
The confluence of Big Data, algorithm design, computational 
capacity, and the Internet of Things has spurred financial incentives to 
research and develop AI applications. It has also increased societal 
and security vulnerabilities, or as some say, “attack surfaces.” There is 
some debate about how and whether these technologies will meet 
their potential, but mostly the debate is about when this will occur. 
This makes the study of emerging technologies and national security 
law imperative, and imperative now. Informed law is most likely to 
guide decision-makers to preferred outcomes before decisions are 
made and budgets spent, rather than the current default options of 
“waiting to see” or “hoping for the best.” Nations are also more likely 
to agree to legal and ethical limitations before real or perceived 
security advantages are gained.  
III. THE THREE PURPOSES OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW
National security law serves three purposes, or rather it can serve 
three purposes if crafted well and wielded wisely. It provides the 
substantive authority to act, as well as the left and right boundaries of 
that action. Law, including executive direction, provides essential 
process. There is nothing inherently good or bad about process. Good 
process is timely, contextual, and meaningful and results in better 
national security outcomes. That is because good process, among 
other things, better fuses intelligence, identifies options, mitigates 
risks, provides for unity of command and message, and addresses the 
pathologies of national security decision-making, like secrecy and 
speed. 
Finally, law provides national security as well as legal values. For 
example, the humane treatment of prisoners in war is both a legal 
value (Geneva Common Article 3) and a national security value 
(humanely treated prisoners are more likely to provide information). 
Often, debates about the authority of the law, such as those over 
Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act and Section 702 of the FISA 
Amendments Act of 2008, are proxy debates about which values in 
law and national security we should emphasize or privilege. In the 
field of emerging technologies, many of these values are expressed in 
Constitutional terms, including the structural framework of the 
Constitution (federalism and separation of powers) and within the 
First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.  
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All three purposes of law are in flux and in play with emerging 
technologies. We tend to teach what we know and are comfortable 
with. And, in government, we tend to focus on the immediate and the 
crisis, rather than tomorrow’s needs, which might avert future crisis. 
Even though there has been a lot of discussion and debate about 
cyberspace and the role of private actors and privacy on the Internet, 
we have, nevertheless, focused on the tactical questions at the expense 
of the strategic. We do not need another conference about Section 
702. 
The bottom line is the United States has not effectively addressed 
and resolved questions of authority, process, or values regarding 
emerging technologies. It is now time to focus on the big technologies 
that will transform national security in the century ahead.  
 
What are those technologies?  How will they impact national 
security? Further, how should we regulate their use, mitigate their 
risks, and utilize their promise, and what are the limitations?  
IV. THE BIG THREE
There are many technologies that will impact national security and 
foreign relations in the century ahead. Some such technologies do not 
yet exist. Three do, and we know now that they will be transformative: 
Artificial Intelligence, Quantum Computing, and Synthetic Biology.     
A. Artificial Intelligence
AI is hard to define because it reaches multiple fields and subfields 
of research and development, including algorithms, big data, and 
machine learning. The Stanford 100 Year Study defines AI as “a 
science, and a set of computational technologies, that are inspired, but 
typically operate quite differently from, the way people use their 
nervous systems and bodies to sense, learn, reason, and take action.”6 
This definition encompasses AI’s myriad parts and directions. At 
present, AI has come closest to its promise and demonstrated the 
most human like machine intelligence (HLMI), or better, regarding 
data aggregation and pattern recognition.  
6 PETER STONE, ET AL., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LIFE IN 2030 4 (2016), 
https://ai100.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/ai100report10032016fnl_singles.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2PU5-VT35]. 
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AI has many national security applications, or potential 
applications. In the military area, these include: Offensive and 
defensive swarm technology, autonomous and semi-autonomous 
weapons, training, and logistics. Moreover, any military task that 
involves danger, repetition, or is undermined by human fear and 
fatigue might, but not necessarily, be better performed by AI enabled 
technology.  
In the intelligence area, AI has obvious capacity to aggregate, sort, 
and weigh data, making it ideal for pattern recognition, anomaly 
detection, and link analysis. For these same reasons it could prove, 
and is proving, a useful tool for authoritarian regimes seeking to 
accomplish the same goals for social control reasons or to undertake 
foreign influence operations. In the decisional area, AI is, or will be, a 
useful tool for fusing information, predicting outcomes, and modeling 
policy choices.  
AI has been around in concept since Alan Turing, Bletchley Park, 
and the Imitation Game. The first academic AI conference occurred in 
1956.7 What has transformed the field in recent years is the advent of 
computational capacity, Big Data, algorithms, neural networks, and 
machine learning. AI’s commercial applications and promise 
guarantees steady R & D funding going forward. However, AI’s 
promise also comes with substantial security risks. These risks include 
the loss of control that comes with autonomous and semi-autonomous 
systems, the challenge of human interfaces with complex technology, 
and the potential for unintended results. AI could also result in 
decisional pathologies generated by the absolute speed AI offers to 
cyber operations and, more generally, decision-makers confronting 
the faster fusion of intelligence and new models of weighted 
predictable policymaking. Furthermore, AI can contribute to 
instability, conflict, economic displacement, and the sorts of 
pathologies generated by an arms race mentality discussed below.    
B. Quantum Computing
The “what” and the “why” of quantum computing is easier to 
explain than the “how” and the “when.” Classical computers, or 
current computers as we know them, use electricity, transistors, and 
7 Rockwell Anyoha, the History of Artificial Intelligence, HARV. UNIV., THE GRADUATE SCH. 
OF ARTS AND SCI.: BLOG, SPECIAL EDITION ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (Aug. 20, 2017), 
http://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2017/history-artificial-intelligence/ 
[https://perma.cc/4QRH-FTQ8].  
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circuits to translate information into binary bits conveying 
information and commands represented as zeros and ones. Over the 
years, engineers have made smaller and smaller silicon chips with 
more and more transistors allowing ever greater data to be stored and 
processed in computers. That is what allows the computer chip in the 
iPhone 5 to store 2.7 times the computational capacity as a 1985 Cray-
2 Supercomputer.8 But the size and storage capacity of electricity 
driven computer chips is finite and approaches quickly. Enter 
quantum computing.  
Quantum computing (QC) seeks to use light rather than electricity 
and the principles of quantum physics to process data (quantum 
physics addresses subatomic particles). The basic building block of QC 
is the qubit, or quantum bit. Subatomic particles have the capacity to 
exist in more than one state—in wave or particle form. That means 
that instead of the essential computational building block one-bit that 
can represent a one or a zero, two qubits could represent four possible 
values at once: OO, O1, 10, and 11. Because qubits exist in more than 
one state, they can both handle more data than a classical binary bit, 
and they can parallel compute in their multiple states. The more 
qubits that are used, the greater and faster the computational power, 
so much so that quantum computers could potentially be more 
powerful than classical computers by a magnitude of billions.9 So far, 
so good.  
That leads to the “why.” With that much computational capacity, it 
means you can accomplish tasks using brute force computation that 
would take classical supercomputers years to accomplish, like 
breaking codes, or are simply not possible to do, like solving the 
molecular riddle of certain diseases. Quantum computing will also 
8 Processing Power Compared: Visualizing a 1 trillion-fold increase in computing 
performance., EXPERTS EXCHANGE, (Last Visited Nov. 18, 2018), https://pages.experts-
exchange.com/processing-power-compared [https://perma.cc/YH5J-LSGL]. 
9 See, Cade Metz, IBM Is Now Letting Anyone Play With its Quantum Computer, WIRED 
(May 4, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/05/ibm-letting-anyone-play-quantum-
computer/ [https://perma.cc/D9EZ-DUJE]; Michael Nielsen, Quantum Computing for 
Everyone, MICHAEL NIELSEN (Aug. 28, 2008), http://michaelnielsen.org/blog/quantum-
computing-for-everyone/ [https://perma.cc/93E6-CTLB]; Tom Abate, Stanford Team 
Brings Quantum Computing Closer to the Reality With New Materials, STANFORD NEWS 
(May 9, 2017), https://news.stanford.edu/press-releases/2017/05/09/new-materials-brg-
closer-reality/ [https://perma.cc/2477-VC8V]; Michael J. Biercuk & Richard Fontaine, The 
Leap into Quantum Technology: A Primer for National Security Professionals, WAR ON 
THE ROCKS (Nov. 17, 2017), https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/leap-quantum-
technology-primer-national-security-professionals/ [https://perma.cc/8823-KPPK].  
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ignite and accelerate AI. The security advantages to a first mover are 
enormous, especially if one’s adversaries are not yet aware you have 
broken their encryption, one has stored past communications to 
decipher, or it is too costly to securely retrofit infrastructures even 
when the QC security risk is known. Imagine the risks if QC ends up in 
the wrong hands, such as the threat to air travel, infrastructures that 
rely on encryption to protect operating systems (energy, water), or 
data and communications, like the financial industry.    
The “how” is more complicated for non-specialists to understand. 
I am not sure scientists and engineers fully understand it either; 
otherwise, we would likely already have quantum computers. 
Quantum computing relies on two concepts: supposition and 
entanglement. Supposition is the capacity of subatomic particles to 
exist in two states seemingly at once. Entanglement is a concept in 
quantum physics that posits that two particles exist in a state of 
interaction such that they can only be understood and measured in 
relation to each other. Among other things, this allows the parallel 
processing of data and thus faster processing. However, one needs to 
understand quantum physics to fully appreciate how exactly quantum 
computing works or might work. I do not and will not pretend 
otherwise here. But I do appreciate in concept why it is difficult to 
isolate and measure particles and light waves in subatomic form, 
based on their size, speed, and changing state. They are unstable. 
Therefore, to use a qubit for computational purposes one needs to 
isolate and measure the qubit in a predictable state of supposition and 
entanglement. This is where much of the research is being conducted. 
One way to slow down and isolate particles for measurement is 
apparently with extremely cold temperatures, like absolute zero, the 
lowest temperature that is theoretically possible. Another way is to try 
and find different and more precise ways to measure qubits with 
lasers.  
That brings us to “when.” IBM has produced a 20-qubit quantum 
computer, which is available for cloud computing and public research. 
IBM has also produced a 50 Qubit computer, which in theory, comes 
much closer to realizing the potential of quantum computing. 
However, the quantum state was “preserved for 90 microseconds—a 
record for the industry, but still an extremely short period of time.”10 
10 Will Knight, IBM Raises the Bar with a 50-Qubit Quantum Computer, MIT TECH. REV. 
(November 10, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609451/ibm-raises-the-bar-
with-a-50-qubit-quantum-computer/ [https://perma.cc/2L3F-FDRW]. 
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Less certain is the timing of and feasibility of a stable qubit computer 
being scaled up to the number of qubits to unlock the potential 
promise of quantum computing. The, or a, challenge is handling the 
size of the mathematical equations and variables that are generated by 
qubit driven computers. “More than a million numbers are needed to 
describe a 20-qubit quantum computer. The contrast with 
conventional computers is striking – a conventional 20-bit computer 
needs only 20 numbers to describe it.”11 It may be that it takes 
quantum computing to solve quantum computing.   
Given the potential national security advantages and risks 
presented by QC and the amount of academic, industry, and 
governmental money being invested into its research and 
development, I would not bet against its arrival in my national 
security lifetime. We better be ready.    
C. Synthetic Biologics
Synthetic biology is the field of science addressed to the creation of 
synthetic (or artificial) biological pathways, organisms, and devices as 
well as the manipulation of natural occurring pathways, organisms, 
and devices.12 A biological pathway is a series of molecular 
interactions that lead to a result. For example, an enzyme used in the 
production of synthetic rubber, which otherwise is produced only in 
rubber trees, a limited natural resource.13 Synthetic biology has been 
used to make vaccines and biosensors. CRISPR is the best-known 
example of a biological tool used to manipulate naturally occurring 
biology through genetic manipulation by isolating, cutting, and 
reordering DNA molecules. 
11 Nielsen, supra note 9.  
12 See, Wikipedia, Synthetic Biology, for an introduction to the disciplines and technologies 
involved in synthetic biology, then, move on to MIT’s Kenneth Oye, among other scholars. 
See, e.g., Kᴇɴɴᴇᴛʜ Oʏᴇ, ET AL., ON REVISION OF THE COORDINATED FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
REGULATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (Mar. 22, 
2016) https://poet.mit.edu/sites/default/files/images/ON%20REVSIONOFCF2016-03-
22-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/25RY-JA5U]; see also, Kenneth Oye, et al., Regulating 
Gene Drives, 345 SCIENCE 626, 626-28 (Aug. 8, 2014).  
13 BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION ORGANIZATION, Current Uses of Synthetic Biology, (May 
31, 2018), https://www.bio.org/articles/current-uses-synthetic-biology 
[https://perma.cc/CN2H-LXUW]. 
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There are many positive examples of how synthetic biology can 
potentially contribute to the common good, such as through the 
creation of biologics that can identify and attack cancerous cells before 
they are detectable using existing diagnostic methods. In the national 
security sphere, synthetic biology could be harnessed to attack 
diseases or prevent the spread of diseases that create conditions of 
instability, conflict, and economic barriers. It is obvious as well that 
synthetic biology can be used to make new chemical weapons and 
biological warfare agents for which no known antidotes or 
prophylactics currently exist. Despite the general prohibition of 
biological and chemical weapons, states (e.g., Russia, Syria, North 
Korea) and non-state actors (e.g., Aum Shinrikyo 1995) may still seek 
to use synthetic biology as a weapon. Gene drives in turn can be used 
for good — for instance, to eradicate a disease carrying insect — or for 
bad — such as, to destroy crops, or to introduce pathogens that will 
only affect certain genetic characteristics associated with a particular 
race or ethnicity. Lawyers and ethicists also debate the limits that 
should apply to the creation of new life forms and the questions 
regarding access and availability to disease cures and treatments. 
Certainly, there are other emerging technologies of national 
security importance. One example is blockchain, a perpetual train of 
encrypted virtual currency transactions, which can serve as a virtual 
wallet or receipt. Additionally, depending on the definition of AI, there 
are numerous subfields warranting national security study, like 
autonomous weapons systems. Lawyers have a professional duty to 
competently and diligently represent their clients, and they cannot do 
this very well without understanding the technology that informs their 
work and safeguards their confidences. For the ABA-OSU Symposium, 
we focused on the two leading digital technological fields, AI and QC, 
because of their potential to transform national security and because 
of OSU’s and I/S’s focus on digital issues.   
V. WHY AN ABA-OSU SYMPOSIUM AND JIRGA ON AI AND QC?
One of the missions of the ABA Standing Committee on Law and 
National Security is to educate the public and the profession on the 
interplay between law and national security. In 2010, the Committee 
started holding a Lawyers Jirga for teachers and professionals to 
facilitate and explore methodologies for teaching national security law 
as well as to bridge the gap between civilian and military teaching 
methods. The name derives from the term for a Pashtun meeting of 
Elders where decisions on governance and law are often addressed 
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and settled in Afghan society. The Ohio State University (OSU) 
Symposium was the ABA’s eighth Jirga and the first addressed 
specifically to technology. 
In concept, the Jirga has three objectives. First, the Jirga aims to 
apply innovative and best practice methods to teaching the national 
security law and policy. Second, it serves as a bridge to the larger 
community of national security actors, reaching practitioners and 
thought leaders outside the Washington Beltway. The Jirga on 
homeland security, for example, took place in Oklahoma City at the 
site of, and on the twentieth anniversary of, the 1995 Alfred P. Murrah 
Federal Building bombing. After all, the topic is national security and 
our Committee derives from the American Bar Association. Third, the 
Jirga is intended, as is the work of the Committee itself, to identify 
and focus the national security legal community on over-the-horizon 
issues and to prepare today’s lawyers to meet tomorrow’s challenges.  
All three of these factors made the Moritz College of Law at the 
Ohio State University an excellent partner for a Symposium and Jirga 
on Emerging Technologies and National Security Law. To start, OSU 
is one of the Nation’s leading research universities. Most of the 
research and development in emerging technologies is occurring at 
research universities, like OSU, Federally Funded Research Centers, 
and in industry (at times, it seems, the government is more spectator 
than participant). The law school also has a reputation for the study of 
digital technology. The fact that the Symposium was supported by a 
leading journal, I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information 
Society, ensured that the voices heard at the Conference would later 
amplify and reach a larger audience. OSU is also increasingly known 
for its emphasis on experiential teaching through its national security 
simulation. Finally, the University has a longstanding tradition of 
honoring and contributing to public service, reflected in, among other 
places, its military history department and Corps of Cadets.   
Having explained why the Committee has focused on emerging 
technologies and done so at OSU, the remainder of this article turns to 
the core takeaways and themes from the Symposium. In identifying 
the key takeaways, my hope is that the next conference will build upon 
these conversations and conclusions, not repeat them. One key 
takeaway is that any successful effort to understand and regulate the 
applications and implications of new technologies will have to bridge 
six constituencies and do so vertically and horizontally. Those 
constituencies are: technology, policy, law, industry, academia, and 
government.   
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VI. KEY TAKEAWAYS 
A. National Security Practitioners must understand all three legs of 
the Emerging Technology Stool — Technology, Policy, and Law
It is now trite to say, but nonetheless true, that national security in 
the digital age rests upon a three-legged stool of policy, law, and 
technology. National security practitioners tend to be proficient in two 
of these three areas. To most effectively practice law or policy in this 
space, however, one needs to be proficient in all three disciplines, 
including the technical aspects of emerging technologies. Why does 
this matter?  
First, without understanding the technology, policymakers and 
lawyers may opt for policy and legal frameworks with unintended 
consequences or that are quickly outdated. Second, they may miss 
opportunities to apply technical solutions to problems that might 
otherwise seem like intractable policy or legal problems, like those 
associated with attribution or accountability. Third, it is hard to 
understand and thus address the due process concerns associated 
with AI, like neural networks operating in the “black box” of deep 
machine learning, without understanding the process by which neural 
networks sort, weigh, and predict outcomes. Fourth, technical comfort 
is important to credibly bridging the camps and constituencies 
integral to effectively craft law and policy directed to industry and 
academia, and not just government actors.  
Applying law to policy is very hard if you do not understand the 
parameters of the policy to which you are applying law. The same is 
true of technology. This means that law schools and policy schools 
need to move beyond their comfort zones and teach more about 
technology, which necessarily means less about something else. This 
may require new hires across generations, the use of additional 
adjuncts, or tapping into the advantages of interdisciplinary 
universities.  
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B. Communicate in Plain English
Lawyers apply law to facts and explain complex areas of the law to 
policymakers while doing so. The best lawyers do so in plain English 
so that policymakers not only understand what the law is, but why the 
law is the way it is, and how the law might apply in different responses 
to evolving and changing facts. The best lawyers tell policymakers 
what it is they need to know, not what it is the lawyer knows.  
Technologists need to learn to do the same if they do not already 
know how to do so. The policy answer to a policy question about 
algorithms is not a mathematical equation. And if the answer takes a 
white board to explain, it will likely not translate well into legislative 
language or policy-talking points. As with lawyers, the trait that is 
most impressive to a security specialist is not how much you know or 
how smart you are, but how smart you are in conveying to 
policymakers what it is they need to know.  
If you want to test this proposition, the lawyer should ask of the 
technologist, “If I were in court and you were my expert, how well 
would you explain the scientific basis for the technology upon which 
the evidence you are about to offer is based?” As some lawyers will 
recognize, this question is rooted in Daubert and Kuohmo Tire, the 
Supreme Court cases providing the framework for authenticating and 
validating new scientific methods before admitting evidence in court 
based on these methods. The policymaker might ask, (1) “If I were 
explaining this technology to the Secretary of State or the President, 
would I want this technologist to do so?”; (2) “How would or should 
he or she spend their five minutes?”; or (3) “Would he or she grasp 
and present the policy implications? Or, just the mechanics of how it 
all works?” 
If you want to take this thought for a dry run, ask your 
technologist to explain Quantum Computing in four sentences or less 
and do so without reference to equations or formulas.     
C. Technology Involves Human Choice, It Does Not Remove It
There is a tendency to treat emerging technologies as inexorable 
and inevitable in their reach, seemingly immune from human control 
or influence. This may not be a surprise in a field that includes robots, 
autonomous weapons, debates about whether there should be a 
human-in-the-loop, and where and how, if so. However, the human 
factor was emphasized repeatedly during the Symposium as speakers 
noted in paraphrased form here and further below:  
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It is a matter of human choice to opt in or out of default privacy 
settings.14 
  
AlphaGo did not defeat Lee Sokol in a game of Go, a team of 
software engineers did.15  
 
It is humans who will resolve competing values many technologies 
present, or who will decide to default to choices made by software 
engineers.16  
 
Compliance with law is a human task.17  
 
Make no mistake about it, emerging technologies present human 
choices, or as one discussant put it, “Machines do not decide things of 
their own free will.”18 Lawyers, technologists, and policymakers need 
not stand by and watch; they control the outcome and they are 
responsible for the outcome. Technology is not a runaway train; it is a 
train with human conductors who can either step up and conduct or 
sit back and hope the train does not jump the rails. The governance 
question is this: who should or will decide to conduct, and in what 
manner?   
14 Peter Weinberger, Software Engineer, Google, The New School, Panelist at the 2018 I/S: 
A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society Symposium: National Security, 
Emerging Technologies, and the Law, Panel: The Future of Digital Intelligence: Artificial 
Intelligence, Cyber, Quantum Computing, and Cryptography Part II at 42:56 (Mar. 23, 
2018). 
15 Peter Asaro, Assoc. Professor, School of Media Studies, The New School, Panelist at the 
2018 I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society Symposium: National 
Security, Emerging Technologies, and the Law, Panel: Artificial Intelligence and National 
Security at 1:15:57 (Mar. 23, 2018). 
16 Judge James E. Baker, Jeff Alstott, Program Manager, Intelligence Advanced 
Research Projects Activity (IARPA), 2018 I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the 
Information Society Symposium: National Security, Emerging Technologies, and the Law, 
Panel: Emerging Technologies, National Security, Law and Ethics: A Conversation (Mar. 
24, 2018). 
17 Allan Schuller, Assoc. Dir., Stockton Ctr. For the Study of Int’l Law, Panelist at 2018 I/S: 
A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society Symposium: National Security, 
Emerging Technologies, and the Law, Panel: Artificial Intelligence and National Security 
(Mar. 23, 2018). 
18 Id. 
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1. Corporate Identity and Responsibility 
A number of speakers observed that we have lost a sense of 
citizenship at the individual and the corporate level.”19, 20 One speaker 
stated that he found no American flags flying or evident at Facebook.21 
Another speaker stated that boardrooms have become their own 
countries.22 Whether or not these observations are purely anecdotal in 
the same manner that the evident patriotism of corporate participants 
at the Symposium is anecdotal, they do reflect ambivalence about 
corporate identity and responsibility. Emerging technologies will place 
additional pressure on corporations to define their identity and 
responsibility when values like privacy, national security, free trade, 
and shareholder value compete. As evidenced by efforts to monetize 
data and questions over how Russia utilized (and utilizes) Facebook 
and other social media platforms for influence operations, there are 
no agreed norms of responsibility, let alone laws, for U.S. 
corporations. Questions abound:  
 
What responsibility do U.S. corporations have to protect national 
security?  
  
How should one define “U.S. Corporation”?  
  
Should the responsibility be defined in a passive or an active way?  
 
19 Diana S. Dolliver, Assistant Professor and Academic Dir., Joint Electronic Crimes Task 
Force, Univ. of Ala. Dep’t of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Herb Lin, Senior Res. 
Scholar for Cyber Pol’y and Sec., Ctr. for Int’l Sec. and Cooperation and Hank J. Holland 
Fellow in Cyber Pol’y and Sec., Hoover Inst., Stan. Univ., Robert S. Litt, Former Gen. 
Couns. to the Off. of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence and Of Couns., Morrison & Foerster, 2018 
I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society Symposium: National 
Security, Emerging Technologies, and the Law, Panel: Issues of Government Organization, 
Capacity and Accountability (Mar. 23, 2018). 
20 Harvey Rishikof, Former Chair, Dep’t of Nat’l Sec. Strategy and Professor of L. and Nat’l 
Sec. Stud., Nat’l War Coll., Panelist at 2018 I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the 
Information Society Symposium: National Security, Emerging Technologies, and the Law, 
Panel: The Future of Digital Intelligence: Artificial Intelligence, Cyber, Quantum 
Computing, and Cryptography Part II at 1:03:00 (Mar. 23, 2018). 
21 Id. at 1:03:32.  
22 Id. at 1:03:20. 
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Should responsibility be defined in law? Determined on a case-by-
case basis?  
 
Should corporations be required to adopt minimum solutions or 
optimum solutions to address security needs and threats?  
 
How, if at all, should answers be different for different 
technologies? Or, with respect to conduct occurring in the cyber 
domain?   
 
Who pays, or as one participant stated, “who takes the monetary 
hit”23 for doing the right thing? 
 
Questions of corporate responsibility are particularly pronounced 
in the supply chain context.  
2. Address Supply Chain Risk Management
Multiple speakers across industry, academia, and government 
alluded to supply chain risk management (SCRM). Indeed, SCRM 
brings many of the themes of the Symposium together, such as those 
of corporate identity and purpose, and arms race risks and security.  
Supply chain risk is defined by the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence with reference to the Intelligence Community as 
“the management of risk to the integrity, trustworthiness, and 
authenticity of products and services within the supply chain. It 
addresses the activities of foreign intelligence entities and any other 
adversarial attempts aimed at compromising the IC supply chain, 
which may include the introduction of counterfeit or malicious items 
into the IC supply chain.”24 Of course, the definition applies generally 
to industry as well. Supply chain risk occurs constantly and 
consistently across the life cycle of a technology’s use from 
manufacture, to production, to assembly, to refurbishment. It is found 
23 Herb Lin, Senior Research Scholar for Cyber Pol’y and Sec., Ctr. for Int’l Sec. and 
Cooperation and Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Pol’y and Sec., Hoover Inst., Stan. Univ., 
Panelist at 2018 I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society Symposium: 
National Security, Emerging Technologies, and the Law, Panel: Issues of Government 
Organization, Capacity and Accountability 56:50 (Mar. 23, 2018). 
24 Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Intelligence Cmty. Directive No. 731, Supply Chain 
Risk Mgmt. (2013), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD%20731%20-
%20Supply%20Chain%20Risk%20Management.pdf [https://perma.cc/JEF9-GKX8].  
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in software, hardware, and the “humanware” that operates and 
maintains equipment. 
The Symposium identified any number of ways to address risk 
management. These include: The adoption of back-up plans and 
resilient systems; designing systems based on the principle of 
suspicion, that is, assuming the risk of penetration; risk scoring; 
protection plans; industry or component standards; provenance and 
authenticity standards; and testing. The Symposium also addressed 
ways to incentivize the adoption of these risk management tools. 
These include: litigation, consumer pressure, taxation incentives, and 
insurance policy and pricing.   
Beyond any specific suggestions, the core message here was to do 
something. Pick something to protect, protect it, and learn from the 
experience about the intended and unintended consequences of doing 
so. That leads to the next general theme. 
3. Do Something
Too often it seems tough problems sit and linger. They are too 
hard. There are too many constituencies. There are too many 
interests. There are no obvious or good solutions. For sure, competing 
values are sometimes best sorted out in context, rather than with 
generalized solutions embedded in law, such as those tradeoffs that 
might occur between open trade and national security.  
But consider how long the United States Government has debated 
cyber questions like:  
 
Which agency or agencies should take the lead in response to 
cyber security? Or,  
 
When does a cyber-attack amount to an armed attack for the 
purposes of policy response, international law, and the law of armed 
conflict? Or, 
 
What should the government tell industry about the threat of 
attack in advance? 
 
These questions were identified at the advent of the digital age in 
the 1980s and 1990s. They are still debated today with only marginal 
development in the past two decades. Sometimes it is better to do 
something, to take a position, evaluate the results, and then adjust, 
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than to default to voluntary “best practices” or the lifeboat mentality 
of “every man for themselves.”  
The complexity of regulating emerging technologies and the 
number of disparate stakeholders can make this space feel 
ungovernable. If the United States government does not take a 
position, or act to fill the vacuum on what law does or should apply to 
emerging technologies, the answers will arrive by default. Legal policy 
will be determined in a decentralized manner by individual actors, 
considering the specific interests of those actors. Google will make 
policy decisions with national security impact based on corporate 
responsibilities and goals. Likewise, disputes will be resolved not 
through the legislative process or rulemaking process - where a full 
range of policy views and outcomes may be addressed - but through 
litigation where the interests of individual parties are paramount, and 
the adversarial process drives parties to zero-sum rather than optimal 
goals and outcomes.  
4. Parkinson’s Law meets Moore’s Law
When it comes to emerging technologies, it seems like there is a 
lot of law. It is just not the sort of law that is taught in law schools or 
that a lawyer might recognize as law. Those who will, can, or shall, 
craft our legal and ethical response to emerging technologies should 
do so conscious of this “law.” There is:  
Parkinson’s Law: Parkinson’s Law is the name of the book by a 
professor at the University of Malaya about bureaucratic process. In 
1957, Northcote Parkinson first observed that work fills the space 
allocated to perform it, among other abiding bureaucratic 
observations. Parkinson’s “law” applies to emerging technologies, 
because there is no time at which point it is certain that emerging 
technologies will come to transform national security. Therefore, the 
task of providing a governing framework will linger. Policymakers will 
push the point of decision and choice further out, until a crisis or 
Sputnik moment forces action. But law is harder to craft in crisis and 
values harder to hold. We should debate and install a legal framework 
now. 
Moore’s Law: Moore’s Law is named for Intel co-founder 
Gordon Moore who in 1965 predicted that the number of transistors 
that could be placed on an integrated circuit would double every two 
years, or depending on one’s source, every eighteen months. The 
transistor is a basic building block of engineering and computational 
capacity because it is the device that switches signals and electricity in 
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computers. The closer the transistors are to each other – hence 
microchips – the faster the computational speed. Moore’s law 
captures both the specific point that microchip storage doubles every 
eighteen months to two years as well as the more general point that 
the pace of technological change is exponential and not linear, and it 
is getting faster all the time.  
Because technology will always outpace the ability (or willingness) 
of Congress to legislate, statutory law should be technology neutral 
and not seek to dictate wise decisions through substantive prescript, 
but rather do so by requiring robust process and accountability. In 
other words, law should not tell decision-makers what to do, but 
rather describe a process of decision that is more likely to lead to wise 
choices. Remember, good process leads to better results.  
What is more, the problem is not just that technology outpaces our 
ability to legislate and regulate, adversaries will learn to make use of 
new technology faster than the government typically makes policy or 
responds, a point made by former Deputy NSA Director Chris Inglis. 
Let us call this Inglis’ Law. That means the law should not only 
contemplate the intended use of technology now, but the unintended 
and nefarious uses tomorrow by unknown actors.  
Murphy’s Law. “Murphy’s law” is an aphorism that posits that if 
something can go wrong, it will. Apparently the “law” has been around 
for some time in different forms, and long before a Defense 
Department scientist named Murphy was associated with the concept. 
Whatever its origin it is a sound principle to keep in mind when 
building a legal framework to address emerging technologies that 
may, or may not, work as intended. History is full of examples of 
technological inventions that did not work as intended. Think of 
Icarus, the Mark 14 and 18 Torpedoes, Apollo 13, as well as Challenger 
and Columbia. The list goes on.   
Murphy’s Law argues for a legal framework that incorporates 
accountability, responsibility, and a process of ongoing review. The 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) is an example. It requires 
a court order for certain electronic surveillance on the front end; 
however, it also requires periodic review and renewal of Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court orders, which orders validate the 
continued existence of a factual predicate, or probable cause, to 
continue the surveillance.  
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5. A Technology Race Brings Predictable Risks
A technological race brings predictable risks of the sorts associated 
with arms races. Arms races consume resources, and thus, potentially 
result in lost opportunity elsewhere. Arms races can also lead to risk 
taking, to keep up or to find an edge. Risk taking may come in the 
form of shortcuts, safety waivers, or reduced oversight to maintain 
security and preserve surprise. Arms races can also reduce 
cooperation and trust in other areas, like trade and diplomacy. Where 
an arms race in fact involves arms, it creates the further risk of their 
intended or accidental use. Of course, implicit in an arms race is the 
risk that if a nation does not keep pace and falls behind it may be 
placed in an untenable position of submission or surrender.  
Law and policy should regulate these risks. In the case of law, this 
should be done with intentional reference to the three purposes of law 
– authority and boundaries, process, and values. Now.     
VII. CONCLUSION
Emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and quantum 
computing are on the cusp of transforming national security practice. 
However, technology and the security threats posed by new 
technologies are exponentially outpacing any corresponding effort to 
articulate and implement a legal and ethical regime to regulate their 
wise and safe national security use. A technology arms race is on. So is 
the law and policy race. Will we understand and regulate the national 
security implications of these technologies before it is too late to do so 
effectively?  
One of many things that makes the field of emerging technologies 
interesting and challenging from a governmental standpoint, is the 
necessity of responding in a horizontal as well as vertical fashion, 
across government and between federal, state, and local authorities. 
Moreover, although the government often speaks of “whole-of-
government” approaches to national security problems, because of the 
importance of industry and academia, emerging technologies requires 
a “whole-of-country” approach. That requires good governance and 
process - in a word, law. It is time for lawyers and policymakers to 
take the lead and do something, conscious of the three purposes of 
law. The ABA-OSU Symposium, we hope, served as a positive step 
forward in doing so.   
 
                                 
